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Commentary
by
James P. Markle*
Initial reading of the authors' proposals prompts recollection of the
damsel who when asked as to the circumstances which resulted in her
having become ensnared into the world's oldest profession responded,
"Just lucky, I guess." The deficiencies described are accurate, albiet
understated, and yet trial counsel when asked for an explanation of
such a state of affairs might with equal candor respond, "Just lucky, I
guess."
Few advocates would fail to display a greviously injured client and
dwell upon the grisly details of the injury to create an inference
".. . difficult, if not impossible, to overcome in a jury's mind . . .
that the product whose use led to this injury must indeed be reasonably
dangerous." The shotgun approach to allegations is decried by the
authors but what worthy pleader would deign to leave unturned the
stone which might provide the foundation for avoiding summary
judgment, the flexibility for the presentation of a subsequently dis-
covered or developed theory of the case, or an unanticipated but ulti-
mately successful basis for sustaining upon appeal the verdict for his
client. In fairness, the authors do not totally condemn shotgun plead-
ing-they merely propose that the extraneous and irrelevant be elimi-
nated at pre-trial and that the technical issues be narrowed to those
germane to the product and issues on trial. However, do the authors
truly believe that busy trial attorneys (and their technical experts),
juggling sufficient cases to fulfill their own economic requirements,
can reach at pre-trial the degree of preparation permitting the true
designation and separation of the extraneous from the relevant? Even
if such be practicably attainable, what will be the effect upon settlement
possibilities if those fringe defendants-dragged in our tenuous theory
at best-will no longer be willing to add their contribution to avoid the
expense, inconvenience, and the remote possibility of liability involved
in litigation?
In one of their more extreme proposals, the authors espouse severe
sanctions when a party "has treated evidence in so cavalier a manner
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as to destroy his opponent's opportunity to conduct his own critical
evaluations . . . ." Such a revolutionary proposal would threaten to
deprive American jurisprudence of memorable advocacy such as the
following:
Take a look at the size of the piece that is missing. It is half the
size of an old three-cent stamp, and that piece was sectioned in sev-
eral pieces so it could be cross-photographed in a microscope.
Do you know what we are dealing with in our office? Specks.
I can't tell you where it is, if I could I wish to God I would. I
don't know where it is. I never ....
The court is going to charge you that if we intentionally lost
that piece so as to prevent you or them from seeing it, you may
draw the greatest of inference from that, and I tell you right now
I want you to go further than the court charges you against me if
you feel that I or anybody from my office intentionally lost that
piece ....
I say throw us out of court, if its my fault or anybody's fault,
regardless, throw us ... .1
The authors would attempt to establish criteria for the qualification
of "experts" to testify in regard to a given product and defect therein.
This would pose obvious difficulties to those broad based "scientists"
who, possessing a Bachelor of Science degree from some congenial
college, are ready and most willing to testify on the entire spectrum of
issues involved in that elusive discipline described as "failure analysis."
Would the authors also advocate that a party be required to identify
all those "experts" to whom the facts had been exposed in a "hypo-
thetical manner" before one was discovered whose "opinion" coin-
cided with the party's theory of the case? Finally, it is notable that the
authors assert that the technical expert should become a "co-equal
partner" to the advocate. A legitimate question may be posed as to
whether this describes a situation as it is and should not be or as it is
not and yet should become.
However, assuming the basic validity of the authors' contentions,
one must ask: is the present so bad? What is really wrong with con-
siderable flexibility which, while it may force a defendant occasionally
to play a reluctant "lady bountiful," may also serve to compensate a
victim who has suffered grevious harm? Finally, even though corrective
measures may be desirable, are not the authors truly naive in implying,
as a realistic possibility, that such change may come to fruition?
1. Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 962, 970 (2d Cir. 1972).
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It is suggested that the authors are not naive, that the present system
does not serve the societal goods commonly attributed to the product
liability concept, and that unless those operating within the system
effectuate change, change may be forced upon them in a manner
much to their detriment.
Product liability litigation suffers conceptually when viewed solely
as a compensatory vehicle. All human misfortune-barring perhaps
the intentionally self-destructive-however incurred, should elicit a
humanitarian urge to soften the sacrifice, to render the unbearable
tolerable. The injured and the dependants of descedents formerly gain-
fully employed require sustenance regardless of whether death or dis-
ability is related to a tort, breach of warranty, unreasonably defective
product, or some "natural phenomena" to which no causal relationship
to the act or ommission of a human agency can be attributed.
Moreover, from a mechanical standpoint, product liability recovery
is inefficient: delay is lengthy; costs and contingency fees commonly
absorb in excess of 40 per cent of recovery; and the extent of the vic-
tim's recovery may be determined not on the basis of true need and
entitlement but upon such extraneous factors as the regional proclivity
to evaluate injury or death in inflated or deflated terms, the preconcep-
tions of the particular judge, and the abilities of counsel for the re-
spective parties.
However, it may be argued that, assuming the inefficiencies, the
product liability suit does little harm as it spreads the risk where it
is best absorbed. This phenomena was forcefully condemned by Judge
O'Sullivan, Senior United States Circuit Judge, dissenting in Laird v.
United States Steel Corp.2
Why should we not have the sophistication and courage to
baldly recognize that no such verdict would likely have been
entered here except for the circumstance that the United States
Steel Corporation is the defendant? In a day of much talk about
equal protection of the law, should not the courts carefully con-
sider whether a particular verdict came about from the apparent
ability of the involved defendant to pay, rather than from a fair
measuring of liability and damages?8
It is submitted that only simplistic economic analysis can support
such a thesis. Manufacturers may be intangible legal entities but their
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3. Id. at 221 (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting).
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costs are absorbed by real people. Where the competitive structure is
such that costs may be passed on directly to the consumers, they bear
the burden. Where competitive forces render this impossible, the em-
ployees and the stockholders may bear the burden, and if the cost is
of sufficient magnitude to result in liquidation, bankruptcy, or severe
business dislocation, it is imposed upon society at large in the form of
lost tax revenue and increased welfare expenditures. Recent visible
conflicts between admittedly socially desirable aims such as ecology v.
energy production; a high standard of living v. international competi-
tiveness and resultant balance of trade considerations; and full employ-
ment v. inflation have all illustrated the truth of the axiom that "there
is no free lunch." No pocket possesses unlimited depth and to dispense
"justice" upon a casual assumption that the loss will be born by those
best equipped to pay is to obfuscate the extent of the societal cost, avoid
examination of the efficiency of the mechanism in fulfilling its purpose,
and becloud the basic equity of the result.
Despite these deficiencies, proponents of the product liability insti-
tution justify it from a conceptual standpoint based upon its corre-
lation with fault, resultant deterrence to the manufacture of a defec-
tive product, and inducement to product improvement. Some product
improvement has no doubt resulted from those cases where counsel
and his experts, operating from a 20-20 hindsight perspective, have es-
tablished with technical accuracy the existence of an unreasonably
dangerous defect. It is doubtful that this function could completely
be supplanted by even the best intentioned and highly informed
bureaucratic a priori judgment as to product safety. The conundrum
remains: given the nature of institutional decisionmaking, how many
saved by a product such as penicillin would have perished before an
individual or bureau, saddled with the burden of omniscience, would
have been satisfied that all relevant parameters of that product's safety
had been explored, warranting its release for public consumption?
It is submitted that despite its obvious deficiencies, the liability con-
cept can serve a valid social purpose in exposing human fallability in
the design or manufacture of a product and motivating corrective
action. However, for this effect to occur, the defendant must be con-
vinced from a purely subjective technical viewpoint that his product
has been credibly determined to have contained a defect which caused
the injury. To the extent that an adverse judgment can be attributed to
legal and technical legerdemain, unrelated to the realities of his product
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as honestly perceived by defendant, the result will be counterproduc-
tive, with the response directed not to product improvement, but to
improvement in trial preparation and defense. Technical personnel will
be diverted from advancement of the manufacturing art to the produc-
tion of demonstrative evidence sufficient to rebut the possible distor-
tions practiced by opposing counsel and its stable of professional ex-
perts. Discovery will be extended ad nauseum to expose the technical
weakness of plaintiff's case, trial will be prolonged and settlement
attitude will harden. In short, righteous indignation rather than honest
contrition will occur. Thus, the unscientific free-wheeling roulette type
of product liability suit is counterproductive when measured in rela-
tionship to the realization of one of its essential purposes and justifica-
tions.
This is the authors' message, the institution of product liability
litigation can exist only so long as it serves, to the full extent of human
potential, to accurately adjudge the existence of an unreasonably
dangerous defect in a product and its causative relationship to the
injury suffered by the plaintiff. In its present state, it does not ade-
quately meet this criterion and if not reformed may face the same "no
fault" extinction as analagous institutions.
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